This paper investigates the characteristics of US and Canadian pension funds that allocate assets to hedge funds. The typical pension fund that invests in hedge funds is a large sophisticated pension fund that diversi…es its portfolio across numerous classes of investments, private equity in particular, uses a core-satellite organization and has access to low delegation costs for alternative assets. Moreover, we …nd that pension funds investing in hedge funds signi…cantly obtained higher global returns.
Introduction
Since 2000, institutional investors have been improving their portfolio diversi…cation and allocating more funds to alternative assets. 1 In particular, hedge fund investments became a signi…cant asset class in the portfolios of numerous institutional investors. In 2007, institutional investors accounted for more than 50% of hedge funds in ‡ows for the …rst time (Mac Kinsey, 2007) ; the largest share of hedge funds'capital has historically come from high net worth individuals (Preqin, 2008; US GAO, 2008) . Pension funds and funds of funds are the main contributors to this change in the client structures of hedge funds.
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In this paper, we investigate the characteristics of pension funds that invest in hedge funds. The growing interest that pension funds have taken in hedge funds occurs in a global context. After the stock market crash of [2001] [2002] and the decline in long term interest rates, pension funds have been looking for sources of higher returns. 3 Consequently, pension funds steadily reorganized their management to improve their strategic asset allocation.
They employ a core-satellite organization, which comes from asset-liabilities management (Sharpe and Tint, 1990) . This structure is known to be an e¢ cient strategy for portfolio diversi…cation through active management (Amenc et al., 2003) . It consists of de…ning a strategic asset allocation and dividing assets between two components: core and satellite.
The …rst (75%-90%) aims to match the liabilities of pension funds via immunization techniques. The objective is to avoid risks related to the variability of the assets of pension funds.
1 Alternative assets are made up of private equity, real assets and hedge fund investments. 2 Funds of funds are collective investment vehicles that allocate assets to several hedge funds to bene…t through a diversi…cation of bene…ts. As a general rule, they are managed by private banks, mutual funds or institutional asset managers. 3 The high returns earned by hedge funds in bear markets between 2001 and 2003 explain the importance of hedge funds in ‡ows over these years.
The core is generally invested in traditional asset classes in liquid markets (large caps, bonds, etc.) and the assets can be managed in either an active or passive way, as well as internally or externally. The second component (10%-25%) is almost exclusively invested in alternative assets (real estate, hedge funds, private equity, infrastructure, etc.). The satellite looks for higher performance (by generating positive alpha returns) and a better diversi…cation of risk (by improving beta). 4 In addition, satellites are exclusively managed externally because these active investments require speci…c expertise that pension funds do not have in-house.
The hedge funds industry, with its objectives of high and allegedly uncorrelated returns, seemed therefore particularly attractive for the satellite component.
Regulators viewed hedge funds as having a positive in ‡uence on …nancial markets (Danielsson and Zigrand, 2007) . However, their light regulation and their speci…c governance raise issues beyond those posed by traditional investments. These issues include risks and challenges related to valuation, leverage, liquidity and the operational risk of hedge fund investments (US GAO, 2010) . Indeed, investors in hedge funds have limited information on the valuation of and the assets underlying their investments. Hedge funds are engaged in complex investment techniques that can involve various …nancial instruments for which there is no benchmark and no market. In addition, hedge funds often have broad latitude to use leverage, which ampli…es both potential gains and losses. As a result, some of the most successful hedge fund strategies display a vulnerability to extreme losses, i.e., negative skewness and very large kurtosis (Amin and Kat, 2002; Agarwal et al, 2004; Khanniche, 2008) . Hedge funds also have speci…c rules that limit an investor's ability to redeem an investment for a 4 Alternative investments allow a portfolio diversi…cation because their return drivers di¤er from the equity and bond markets drivers (Schneeweis, Kazemi and Martin, 2001) . de…ned period of time; generally corresponding to a one year lockup period. Additionally, hedge funds impose higher fees.
5 As a result, investors need to earn a higher gross return to achieve a higher net return (Ackermann et al., 1999) . Finally, a hedge fund's active or risky trading activity may result in losses due to operational failures such as trading errors or outright fraud (operational risk).
The particulars of hedge fund investments -related mainly to valuation, leverage, liquidity and operational risk-imply that many pension funds do not have the necessary abilities or incentives to invest in this category of alternative assets. Investments in hedge funds should, for example, be made by those with the skills required to select hedge funds managers and require su¢ cient bargaining power to negotiate contractual terms related to fees and information disclosure.
Attention had increasingly focused on the management and investment practices of pension funds. However, few studies focus on pension funds' contractual delegation to their hedge fund managers. This paper aims to bridge this gap through the use of an original and representative database from CEM benchmarking. This database concerns the investment strategies of US and Canadian De…ned Bene…ts pension funds, over the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] .
The …rst aim of this article is to analyze the extent to which US and Canadian pension funds allocate to hedge funds and to identify the main characteristics of the pension funds investing in hedge funds. Second, we investigate the implications of allocating pension fund assets to hedge funds. More precisely, we propose to evaluate the bene…ts of hedge fund investments with respect to returns and to question to what extent pension funds have tackled speci…c agency problems in their delegation to hedge funds.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and descriptive statistics. Section 3 assesses the characteristics of the pension funds allocating to hedge funds. Section 4 investigates the relationship between pension funds'global returns and their allocation to hedge funds. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Dataset and descriptive statistics
We use the CEM benchmarking database, which provides data on individual de…ned bene…t pension plans from the US and Canada from 1990 to 2008. The data include assets under management (in millions of dollars); costs and returns, which are available by asset class and by the nature of their delegation (active/passive and external/internal). 6 In addition, the database provides the policy asset allocations (in %) (i.e., strategic asset allocations, de…ned before buy and sell decisions) and their expected return by asset class as well as other information regarding global costs (custody, consulting and oversight). The database also indicates whether the fund is publicly or privately owned.
According to Mac Kinsey (2007), OECD (2008) and US GAO (2008) , US de…ned bene…t (DB) pension funds were valued at $4,250 billion in 2007. 7 Assets under the management of the US pension funds listed in the CEM benchmarking database accounted for $2,500 billion in 2007, i.e., around half the value of US DB pension funds in terms of assets under 6 Total assets are disaggregated into 7 classes: equity, …xed income, real assets, private equity, hedge funds, cash and tactical asset allocation (TAA). In addition, for assets under management, equities and …xed income assets are also disaggregated into subclasses. 7 More precisely, total assets managed by US pension funds amounted to $9,500 billion in 2007 and approximately half of those assets were managed by DB pension funds. 5 management. Concerning Canada, more than 93% of pension funds were de…ned bene…t in 2004, while their assets under management amounted to about $700 billion in 2006 (OECD, 2007) . The CEM benchmarking database seems to be representative, as it reports that $460 billion of assets were under management in 2006.
We focus our empirical analysis on the period from 2000 to 2008 because pension funds began allocating to hedge funds in 2000.
8 More precisely, we have an unbalanced panel of 1,973 observations for 407 pension funds, among which 86 invested in hedge funds for at least one period. Concerning the geographic distribution, 274 pension funds in our dataset come from the US, and 72 of these US pension funds invested in hedge funds for at least one period. To our knowledge, the information provided by the CEM benchmarking database concerning allocations to hedge funds has rarely been used in related pension fund studies.
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In this section, we present general descriptive statistics concerning pension funds'allocations to hedge funds. In addition, we suggest several characteristics of pension funds that could be related to the decision to invest in hedge funds. Table 1 shows the average portfolio allocation for the full sample and for the subsample of pension funds investing in hedge funds. In the full sample, equities are the primary assets and account for approximately 60% of the portfolio, followed by …xed income assets, which represent approximately 30% of the portfolio. The remainder of the portfolio is allocated to 8 There is no distinction in the database between allocations to hedge funds or to funds of hedge funds. 9 For example, French (2008) compare the fees, expenses and trading costs society pays to invest in the U.S. stock market along with an estimate of what would be paid if everyone invested passively. Bauer, Cremers and Frehen (2010) document the performance and costs of the domestic equity investments of a large sample of US pension funds (small-large size) in comparison with mutual funds. alternative assets, mainly real assets (approximately 4%) and private equity (approximately 3%). Allocations to hedge funds only represent 0.61%, indicating both that numerous pension funds do not invest in hedge funds and that pension funds consider the three categories of alternative assets di¤erently. Focusing on the subsample of pension funds investing in hedge funds, Table 1 highlights how the portfolio allocation is modi…ed when pension funds decide to invest in hedge funds. The average allocation to hedge funds jumps to 4.57%.
Allocation to hedge funds
The allocation to other alternative assets also increases. Real assets and private equity represent 6.16% and 4.98% of total assets respectively. These reallocations are made through a reduction in equities, which account for 52.52% of total assets.
To illustrate more precisely the pension funds'allocations to hedge funds (HF i;t ), Figure   1 represents the percent distribution of HF i;t for the subsample of pension funds investing in hedge funds. For more than 50% of these pension funds, investments in hedge funds represent less than 3% of total assets. However, several pension funds are investing more than 10% of their total assets in hedge funds with a maximum of 36.69%. In the US, the federal government does not speci…cally limit or monitor private sector de…ned bene…t plans investments in hedge funds, and state approaches to public pension plans vary.
10 Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, …duciaries (pension fund administrators) must comply with a standard of prudence (including the diversi…cation of assets and minimizing the risk of large losses), but there is no explicit restrictions on allo- 10 We can classify pension funds by two criteria that can be mixed: the …rst is concerned with bene…ts, which can be de…ned or not; the second relates to sponsorship, which can be private or public. A de…ned bene…t (DB) plan promises participants a speci…ed monthly bene…t at retirement. In this context, plan sponsors bear the investment risk. On the contrary, a de…ned contribution (DC) plan does not promise a speci…c amount of bene…ts at retirement. In addition, public and private DB plans are not subject to the same regulatory framework. The federal government monitors private sector DB plan investments and state governments monitor the investments of public DB plans. 7 cations to hedge funds. The prudent man standard does not explicitly prohibit investment in any speci…c category. An unsuccessful individual investment is not considered a per se violation of the prudent man standard. Table 2 gives a breakdown of the number of pension funds by year in the full sample. In addition, Table 2 The interest of pension funds in hedge funds may also be highlighted by the strategic allocation, also known as the policy weight (P W i;t ). Table 3 reports some descriptive statistics for several variables used in our empirical analysis. The average policy weight of hedge funds is higher than the e¤ective allocation (HF i;t ) and reaches 1.03% in the full sample. Focusing on the subsample of pension funds investing in hedge funds, the policy weight and the e¤ective allocation seem very close on average, at 4.62% and 4.57% respectively. However, the policy weight and the e¤ective allocation can diverge noticeably. Several pension funds investing in hedge funds report a policy weight equal to 0, and conversely, several pension funds reporting a positive policy weight do not invest in hedge funds. For example, the policy 8 weight is equal to 0 for 36% of the subsample of pension funds investing in hedge funds.
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As a result, the policy weight of hedge funds can provide a distorted representation of the e¤ective investments pension funds make in hedge funds. Therefore, we focus our empirical analysis on the e¤ective allocation (HF i;t ) rather than on the policy weight (P W i;t ).
Sophistication of pension funds
Hedge funds represent one category of alternative assets in which pension funds invest. Real assets and private equity are the two other categories. Real assets include real estate investment trusts (REITs), real estate, commodities and infrastructure (mainly for corporations o¤ering public services, e.g., natural monopolies). Private equity funds are funds specializing in funding innovation via corporate creation (venture capital), growth of small and mid-sized …rms (expansion) and the purchase of diverse …rms (leverage buyouts). Table 3 reports the percentages of private equity (P RIV i;t ) and real assets (REAL i;t ) in total assets as well as the sum of these two components (ALT i;t ). The average of ALT i;t is 6.45% in the full sample and 11.15% for pension funds investing in hedge funds. The averages suggest therefore that pension funds that invest more in private equity and real assets have the increased incentives or skills to invest in hedge funds.
The degree of sophistication of pension funds can be evaluated more generally through di¤erent indicators. De suggest that the home bias in asset allocation reveals the "degree of shortsightedness" of investors. International diversi…cation in investment allocation could, therefore, be positively associated with the degree of sophistica-tion of pension funds. International diversi…cation (F OR i;t ) is measured by the percentage of foreign equities in the equity portfolio. Foreign equities represent 37.64% of the equity portfolio in the full sample and 43.44% for pension funds investing in hedge funds (Table 3) .
Pension funds with a lower home bias tend to invest more in hedge funds.
Policy weight could also be informative with respect to the identi…cation of sophisticated funds. Figure 2 represents the percent distribution of policy weights for equities. Policy weights are frequently a multiple of 5%. More precisely, the policy weight for equities is …xed at 55%, 60%, 65% or 70% for more than 40% of our sample. De Dreu and suggest that the use of these attractive numbers reveals a lack of a sophisticated method of selecting investments. Indeed, asset allocation models should give an accurate number, while rounding to the nearest 5% indicates the use of human judgment. We create the dummy variable RN D i;t ; which takes the value one if the policy weight for equities is a multiple of 5% and zero otherwise. In the full sample, approximately 50% of the observations round their equity policy weights. In the subsample of pension funds investing in hedge funds, this percentage is reduced to 30%, which could indicate that pension funds using an accurate method to choose equity policy weights also tend to invest in hedge funds.
We consider a …nal indicator of sophistication based on performances in traditional asset classes, i.e., in …xed incomes and equities. All pension funds hold traditional assets, which can be managed actively or passively and externally or internally.
12 According to the smart money e¤ect, sophisticated investors make smart choices to identify funds that subsequently perform well. As a result, decisions made by sophisticated pension funds should lead on average to better performances in the core component. We compute a dummy variable SF i that takes the value one if the pension fund has an average return (net of delegation costs) in the core component higher than the average obtained for the full sample. By de…nition, approximately 50% of pension funds are classi…ed as sophisticated in the full sample using variable SF i . 13 In the subsample of pension funds investing in hedge funds, this percentage rises to 58%. The descriptive statistics provide evidence that funds that are smart in the core component also tend to invest in hedge funds.
Portfolio management
Portfolio management is noticeably di¤erent across pension funds. Practices regarding delegation and diversi…cation can highlight these di¤erences. Ownership and size can also a¤ect portfolio management, speci…cally concerning preferences about allocations to hedge funds.
The management can be active or passive and external or internal. In our dataset, pension funds generally manage their assets through external and active management. Table 3 shows that the percentage of assets under external and active management (EA i;t ) represents on average approximately 70% of total assets, both in the full sample and in the subsample of pension funds investing in hedge funds. Consequently, the descriptive statistics do not exhibit a clear link between preferences regarding delegation and allocation to hedge funds.
The degree of diversi…cation is assessed by the sum of the squares of the percentage asset allocations (DIV i;t ). 14 This measure is computed in the spirit of a Her…ndahl index. Table 3 shows that the variable DIV i;t is on average lower for pension funds investing in hedge funds (0.17) than in the full sample (0.23). As a result, pension funds pursuing a higher portfolio diversi…cation invest more in hedge funds.
Pension funds are owned either publicly or privately. In the full sample, 259 pension funds (out of 407) are owned privately, i.e., approximately 60% of the pension funds in the dataset. A similar division is observed in the subsample of pension funds investing in hedge funds, with 48 pension funds (out of 86) are owned privately. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the subsample of private pension funds. These statistics are similar to those obtained for the full sample, which suggests that private and public pension funds share several characteristics. For example, allocation to hedge funds (HF i;t ) is on average similar in the full sample and in the subsample of private funds. When pension funds invest in hedge funds, the average allocation is 4.57% in the full sample and 4.33% in the subsample of private funds.
The size of investors is frequently informative for an understanding of investment policies.
The average of total assets for the pension funds (T A i;t ) in the full sample is $10,878 million.
Pension funds investing in hedge funds are signi…cantly larger with an average of total assets of $22,802 million. Therefore, a size e¤ect could have an e¤ect on the investments pension funds make in hedge funds.
(high yield bonds, mortgage bonds, etc.).
Costs and returns
Delegation costs for alternative assets under external and active management (DC AEA i;t ) are particularly high. On average, these delegation costs are 1.77% in the full sample and 1.84%
for pension funds investing in hedge funds. Delegation costs for equity (DC E i;t ), the main asset of pension funds, are around 0.30%. Pension funds therefore face delegation costs 5 or 6 times higher when they decide to invest in alternative assets under external and active management rather than in equity. In addition, the standard deviation of the variable
is high, suggesting that pension funds do not face similar conditions when investing in alternative assets.
These prohibitive costs can be explained by several factors. Most hedge funds strategies use high trading volume with a great deal of operational support and incur important research (front o¢ ce) costs. Moreover, hedge funds are often small entities with few employees (Cumming and Dai, 2007) . They are typically called "boutiques". Hedge funds managers are therefore more eager to concentrate their e¤orts on the front o¢ ce tasks (to bene…t from opportunities) than administrative tasks. Hedge funds tend to delegate other operations to specialized services providers (administration, IT, back o¢ ce, middle o¢ ce, compliance services, legal services, etc.). These services do not require the particular expertise of hedge funds managers. They are more the business of investment bankers. This increasing externalization of supporting services/activities has two consequences: an increase in the costs of delegation management and more di¢ cult monitoring resulting from a lengthening of the investment channel with more numerous intermediates (see KPMG (2008) for a survey of hedge fund cost structures). 
Empirical framework
We consider the following empirical speci…cation 15 :
with:
where i N (0; 2 ) is a time-invariant individual random e¤ect, j;t is a country-and-time …xed e¤ect, X i;t is the regressor vector (including an intercept), is a vector of unknown parameters and " i;t N (0; and SIZE i;t 1 are included with a lag to avoid simultaneity and endogeneity problems.
Furthermore, we compute the variance in ‡ation factors (VIF) to assess whether there is a collinearity problem between the regressors. The average VIF is 1.30 and the maximum is 1.78, which suggests that the regressors are independent.
The model is …rst estimated with the random-e¤ects maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) . 17 This estimator assumes that random e¤ects are independent of the regressors.
This assumption is relaxed with the Mundlak (1978) correction, which supposes that unobserved heterogeneity is a function of the means of the regressors. In a second speci…cation including the Mundlak (1978) correction, random e¤ects are de…ned as:
where is a vector of unknown parameters and ! i N (0; 2 ! ) is a time-invariant individual random e¤ect: Equation (3) allows us to tackle the correlation between unobserved e¤ects and the regressors in the Tobit framework. 16 The Tobit model is based on a latent (i.e. unobservable) dependant variable (HF i;t ) generated by a classical linear regression model. The latent variable HF i;t is only observed if HF i;t > 0. The observable dependent variable HF i;t is de…ned to be equal to the latent variable whenever the latent variable is above zero and zero otherwise. 17 In short panels, the …xed e¤ects MLE is inconsistent (see Cameron and Trivedi (2005) ).
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The estimated coe¢ cients measure the marginal e¤ect of the independent variable on the latent variable (HF i;t ). We also report the marginal e¤ects for the expected value of the dependent variable conditional on it being uncensored. Considering the marginal e¤ects of the regressors on the observed variable (HF i;t ) allows for a quantitative interpretation of the results.
Results
Results are displayed in Table ( 4). Speci…cation (1:a) corresponds to the estimations of Equation (2) with the random-e¤ects MLE. In speci…cation (1:b), the Mundlak (1978) correction is included. Including the Mundlak correction does not modify the conclusions.
First, allocations to private equity and real assets do not a¤ect the allocation to hedge funds in the same way. The results show a positive and signi…cant relationship between private equity (P RIV i;t 1 ) and hedge fund allocations, while real assets (REAL i;t 1 ) do not have a signi…cant e¤ect. More precisely, the estimated marginal e¤ects in Table (4) from speci…cation (1:b) show that a 1% increase in the private equity allocation leads to a 0.059% increase in the hedge fund allocation. This result highlights the fact that private equity and hedge funds have similarities. More and more hedge funds are turning to a speci…c investment style: event driven, which is a strategy very similar to that used in private equity. Indeed, event driven strategies involve long or short term investments in the securities of corporations undergoing signi…cant change (e.g., spin-o¤s, mergers, liquidations and bankruptcies). Such changes often provide managers with a tangible catalyst by which the manager may be able to perceive the expected change in value in the underlying security.
Substantial pro…ts may be generated by managers who correctly analyze the impact of the anticipated corporate event, predict the course of restructuring and take positions accordingly. In 2010, the event driven strategy was that used the most frequently by hedge fund managers (HFR, 2010) . The di¤erence between hedge funds and private equity is becoming increasingly blurred. Consequently, hedge funds and private equity occupy a particular place in the class of alternatives. They are considered to be more risky strategies than real assets are. Pension funds that invest in real assets are less interested in superior returns than in protection against in ‡ation because pension bene…ts are in real terms (Alestalo and Puttonen, 2006) . Real assets tend to be placed among the traditional asset classes. According show that hedge fund allocations increase by 0.342% when the log of total assets increases by 1. This result con…rms that management delegation in alternative assets implies a long and costly process of selecting hedge funds or a style of hedge funds. Large pension funds are therefore in a better position to invest in hedge funds (Rigot and Tadjeddine, 2010) .
Finally, concerning ownership, the coe¢ cient of variable T Y P i is not signi…cant at the 10% level. The ‡exible prudent man rule is more and more frequently applied by public pension funds, even though some restrictive quantitative rules remain. This trend could explain why we do not …nd di¤erences between the regulatory frameworks for public and private pension funds.
Lastly, the descriptive statistics showed that delegation costs for alternative assets under external and active management (DC Consequently, the degree of transparency, liquidity and the terms of performance are the result of the balance of power between hedge fund managers and pension fund administrators.
In this contractual framework, some pension funds can demand more relevant and detailed information and negotiate contractual terms related to fees. For example, large pension funds naturally have a greater bargaining power (Rigot and Tadjeddine, 2010) . However, the subprime crisis has revealed that this balance of power was rather in the hedge funds'
favor. Indeed, until the crisis, pension funds tended to trust their hedge fund managers (e.g., they did not negotiate contractual terms or require the disclosure of information disclosures)
as long as the hedge fund's performance was high and decorrelated. This passive behavior prevents pension funds from making a good risk evaluation, and may be prejudicial because pension funds are institutional investors that collect savings from employees (…nal investors)
to pay long term retirement bene…ts. The large losses registered by pension funds in their hedge fund allocations in 2008 have induced mistrust and have incited pension funds to negotiate lower fees, shorter lockup periods and more informational disclosures as well as the use of independent service providers to monitor returns (Shabad, 2009).
In conclusion, the typical pension fund that invests in hedge funds is a large private sophisticated pension fund that diversi…es its portfolio across numerous classes (in private equity in particular), uses core-satellite organization and has access to low delegation costs for alternative assets. Now that we have identi…ed the characteristics of the pension funds allocating to hedge funds, we can consider the potential bene…ts of this allocation.
Returns and allocation to hedge funds
We investigate the impact of hedge fund investments on the global returns obtained by pension funds.
First, we could expect a direct e¤ect. Investments in hedge funds are made both to generate positive "alpha returns" and for asset diversi…cation, which could lead to a positive e¤ect on global returns. However, the high costs that pension funds incur by investing in hedge funds and the relatively low allocations to hedge funds might weaken this relationship.
Indeed, hedge funds have speci…c governance (i.e., contractual terms) with their investors.
Moreover, they purportedly generate alpha returns via complex strategies and the use of …nancial instruments that are not allowed for mutual funds, such as leverage and short selling. Consequently, these investments are more risky and more expensive.
Second, we could also expect an indirect e¤ect. As stated in the descriptive statistics 20 and in the previous section, pension funds investing in hedge funds are more diversi…ed, more sophisticated and larger. All the bene…cial aspects these characteristics have on global returns could be captured through allocation to hedge funds.
Empirical framework
We consider the following empirical framework:
where R i;t is the global net return obtained from the whole portfolio, j;t is a country-andtime …xed e¤ect, i is a time-invariant individual e¤ect and u i;t N (0; 2 u ) is a time-varying idiosyncratic random error. 19 The Hausman test is implemented to determine if i should be considered as an individual …xed-e¤ect or as an individual random e¤ect. Equation (4) allows us to test if allocation to hedge funds has a signi…cant e¤ect on the global return after controlling for ownership (T Y P i;t ), country-and-time ( j;t ) and individual ( i ) e¤ects. Alternatively, Equation (4) is estimated with the variable hf i;t -a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the pension fund invests in hedge funds and 0 otherwiseinstead of HF i;t : Bene…cial aspects on global returns could be related to the decision to invest in hedge funds rather than the proportion allocated to hedge funds. Therefore, considering hf i;t instead of HF i;t allows us to identify if the e¤ect of hedge funds on global returns is direct (i.e., related to the proportion allocated) or indirect (i.e., related to the decision to allocate).
The distinction between the direct and indirect e¤ects is also assessed with a modi…cation of the endogenous variable in Equation (4). We de…ne R 0 i;t as the net return obtained from the sub-portfolio excluding allocations to hedge funds. As a result, considering variable R 0 i;t instead of R i;t in Equation (4) Speci…cation (2:a) in Table ( 5) shows that allocation to hedge funds (HF i;t ) has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect at the 10% level on global returns (R i;t ). The estimated coe¢ cient is 0.1079. In speci…cation (2:b) the variable hf i;t is used instead of HF i;t identify whether the e¤ect is direct or indirect: We obtain a positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient at the 1% level. Global returns are, on average, higher for pension funds investing in hedge funds.
Results
More precisely, global returns increase by 1.1377%. The bene…cial aspects of hedge funds therefore seem to be related to the decision to invest in hedge funds and not especially to the proportion of the allocation.
In speci…cations (2:c) and ( 
Conclusion
Institutional investors have had an increasing interest in hedge funds since the beginning of the 2000's due to their promises of high and decorrelated returns. In this paper, we investigate the characteristics of pension funds allocating to hedge funds, and we question the potential bene…ts of these speci…c alternative investments. We …nd evidence that the typical pension fund investing in hedge funds is a large, sophisticated pension fund that diversi…es its portfolio across numerous classes (in private equity in particular), uses coresatellite organization and has access to low delegation costs for alternative assets. Moreover, our results emphasize the bene…cial aspect of investments in hedge funds in terms of returns.
This positive e¤ect is more due to the decision to invest in hedge funds than to the size of the allocation or the return on the hedge fund investments. Consequently, this bene…cial aspect is mainly driven by an indirect e¤ect. Pension funds investing in hedge funds combine several characteristics that positively a¤ect their returns such as improved diversi…cation.
Recent …nancial disturbances have shown, however, that hedge funds are not unsinkable.
Losses in hedge fund allocations were higher than those allocated to private equity and real assets. 20 Speci…c agency problems in hedge fund delegation and a certain passivity in the behavior of pension funds could explain this lower performance. Bene…ts could therefore be higher if pension funds were to adopt stronger monitoring concerning their delegation to 20 In 2008, the returns on private equity and real asset allocations were between -5% and 10%. 
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Note: R i;t is the global net return obtained from the whole portfolio, R 0 i;t is net return obtained from the sub-portfolio excluding allocations to hedge funds and R c i;t is the net return in the core component. a, b and c indicate signi…cance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard deviations are in brackets. Standard deviations reported in the table correspond to the robust standard deviations. All the estimates include ownership and country-and-time e¤ects.
